Monday, October 26, 2009
Thursday, October 15, 2009
This ultimately puts the population in the center of the crossfire, as Pakistan troops bent on destroying the Islamist militants use all available means to destroy the enemies.
This is based partly upon training that is based on a nightmare scenario in which Pakistan goes to war with India. Both states possess nuclear weapons and have been at odds over Kashmir for decades.
However, Pakistan is not coordinating a campaign that will rid their FATA region and the Northwestern Territories of al-Qai'da and Taliban militants. Their "enemy-centric" form of violent conventional warfare may undermine the "population-centric" strategy that the US military has only recently implemented.
My papers "A 21st Century Framework of Counterinsurgency" will tackle transnational and global insurgency and my paper "Pakistan's Folly" deals with the inadequacies of Pakistan's effort to thwart the Neo-Taliban insurgents in gaining ground in the mountains of Pakistan.
Please refer to my essays on the right, or check out this new article from The Economist:
Wednesday, October 14, 2009
She spoke to WFHB, the public radio station of Bloomington, Indiana regarding various subjects.
Washington Post: Bureaucratic Infighting Between the Allocation of Resources Necessary to launch CI Operations in Afghanistan
It is my view that the military should take the lead in counterinsurgency operations, with civilians conducting stability operations once combat operations have ceased in a given area. It seems like the DoD and the DoS are fighting between who does what.
I say let the military take the lead and the State Department can conduct its operations in areas where civilians can make progress and results without being undermined by insurgent forces.
It can be viewed at:
Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. “Greed and Grievance in civil war,” World Bank Paper, 2001.
Collier, Paul. "Doing Well out of War," World Bank Paper, 1999.http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTKNOWLEDGEFORCHANGE/Resources/491519-1199818447826/28137.pdf
Fearon, James. “Why do some civil wars last so much longer than others?” unpublished manuscript, 2002.
Kalyvas, Stathis. “The ontology of ‘political violence’: Action and identity in civil war,” Perspectives on Politics 1, no. 3 (2003): 475-93.
Kaufmann, Chaim. “Possible and impossible solutions to ethnic civil wars,” International Security 20, no. 4 (1996): 136-75.
Stedman, Stephen. “Spoiler problems in peace processes,” International Security 22, no. 2 (1997): 5-53.
Walter, Barbara. “The critical barrier to civil war settlement,” International Organization 51, no. 3 (1997): 335-64.
Theory and Case Studies:
1. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, by Dr. John Nagl and Peter J. Schoomaker
2. The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One, by Dr. David Kilcullen
3. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, by David Galula
4. Organizations at War: In Afghanistan and Beyond, by Abdulkader Sinno
5. The Logic of Violence in Civil War, by Stathis N. Kalyvas
5. In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan, by Seth G. Jones
6. Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan, by Antonio Guistozzi
7. Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan: RAND Counterinsurgency Study--Volume 4 (2008), by Seth G. Jones
8. The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System, Second Edition, by Barnett Rubin
9. Descent into Chaos: The U.S. and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia, by Ahmed Rashid
10. Triage: The Next Twelve Months in Afghanistan and Pakistan, by Andrew M. Exum, Nathaniel C. Fick, Ahmed A. Humayun, Dr. David Kilcullen
The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, by Sarah Sewell, Gen. David Petraeus, and John Nagl.
The U.S. Army Stability Operations Field Manual: U.S. Army Field Manual No. 3-07, by Janine Davidson, William B. Caldwell IV, Michele Flournoy, and Shawn Brimley
The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern Wars, by Dr. David Ucko
More to Come...
The report can be found here:
After I read it, I will post a review and the key arguments.
This is a blog dedicated to the discussion of counterinsurgency (CI) warfare operations. The theory, strategies, and tactics behind counterinsurgency will be examined while providing concrete updates on existing counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The creator of the website is a recent graduate of Indiana University in Bloomington, Indiana, where he graduated with honors in political science. His academic focus is military policy and the economics of war. His senior honors thesis examined the relationship between the Afghan opium economy and the Neo-Taliban insurgency. He argued that opium essentially creates a barrier between the Afghan goverment and the population, allowing for the insurgents to take advantage of this separation. He has studied counterinsurgency warfare intensively for three years, and is active in bringing educated discussion of how to properly conduct CI operations
Please email me at firstname.lastname@example.org if you have any material you would like to see posted!